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Abstract This paper examines Robert E. Lucas's views on the relationship of macroeconomics to real world economic phenomena, and on Keynes's place in its history,
suggesting that these stem from a particular and debatable understanding of how the subdiscipline has evolved. It considers some implications for today's awkward economic
facts of aspects of Keynes' General Theory, not so much its speculations about the role of
psychology and social conventions in the economic decisions of individual agents
recently highlighted by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) however, as its insights into the
influence of the monetary system on the coordination of these decisions, along lines later
extended by Clower (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968). It concludes that the questions
about co-ordination that Keynes addressed, not to mention some of his answers, are well
worth revisiting.
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* Revised version of a paper presented to the History of Economics Society in Denver
Colorado on June 28th, 2009 and at a conference on Perspectives on Keynesian
Economics held at Ben Gurion University, Israel on July 14th-15th 2009. I am grateful for
comments received on that occasion from many participants, and also to Roger
Backhouse, Bradley Bateman, Harald Hagemann, Peter Howitt and Michael Parkin for
various suggestions about an earlier draft. Of course only the author is to be blamed for
this one.

I The Current Economic Crisis and Macro-economic Ideas
The current economic crisis has a number of aspects, not least an intellectual one
occurring at the interface between the currently dominant approach to macroeconomic
theory and empirical evidence. It is not just that most economists failed to foresee what
was coming and that their models now require a little readjustment in order to catch up
with the evidence. Rather, it is that adherence to the fundamental principles upon which
most of those models are grounded renders such adjustments impossible. That is why
renewed interest in John Maynard Keynes' ideas is so welcome, even if, so far this seems
to be having little effect on what Departments of Economics are actually teaching.1
What is nowadays called macro-economics is driven by a rather distinctive
internal dynamic that differs significantly from the story of unidirectional technical
progress which, in the eyes of so many of its current practitioners, makes the study of its
history unnecessary. Though the sub-discipline ceased to be a series of essentially ad hoc
responses to current events at some time in the mid-19th century, contemporary
happenings have nevertheless continued to exert a systematic influence on its subsequent
development. That is because they have provided not just policy challenges, but also
ongoing empirical tests of its evolving theoretical content.
The development of macro-economics has thus involved a strong element of
Popperian "conjecture and refutation", but it has also displayed a tendency to double back
on itself from time to time to pick up still useful but temporarily mislaid ideas as starting
points for subsequent development. Two factors seem to have played a role here. First, as
Harry Johnson (1971) noted, the ability to cope with a currently important policy issue
can be an important determinant of a macro-economic doctrine's success. As particular
policy problems come and go, therefore, so do ideas that can address them, eventually
1

Under the catchy headline, "Ivory Tower Unswayed by Crashing Economy", a recent New York Times
article (Patricia Cohen 2009) reported that American economics departments that have long been paying
attention to Keynes's ideas continue to do so, that those that have not, still do not, and that neither group is
planning to change its ways. That Cohen – quoting department chair Phil Reny - reveals that Chicago
graduate students work on topics " - like real models of business cycles - that are at the frontier of the field"
is no surprise, but it is nevertheless disconcerting to learn that that they don't study Keynes (or Hyman
Minsky, whose ideas also were discussed by Cohen) at all because they are "not on the frontier any more".
Though I would not advocate putting this pair on anyone's theory reading list – pace, at least two of
Cohen's interviewees James Galbraith, and Randall Wray – there used to be history of thought courses
where students might encounter earlier ideas that might at some time turn out to have renewed relevance at
the subject's shifting frontier. I am grateful to Sandra Peart for drawing my attention to this article
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falling into neglect – sometimes temporarily - not always because they have been refuted
by empirical happenings but because they have been rendered temporarily irrelevant by
them. Thus, the problem of unemployment dominated inter-war discourse, but in the late
1960s the need to cope with inflation gave a strong impetus to what Johnson called "the
monetarist counter-revolution", in the process generating renewed interest in the ideas of
Henry Thornton (e.g.1802), Irving Fisher (e.g. 1911) and Knut Wicksell (e.g. 1898)
among others, and giving a considerable head-start to those who had already read these
authors. And second, sometimes lines of investigation are abandoned for want of the
analytic means needed to carry them further, only to be resurrected later when advances
in technique remove these barriers. A striking example of this tendency is in the changing
treatment of expectations in macro-economics, first during the 1930s when, at the hands
of Keynes (1936) exogenous expectations replaced technically unmanageable ideas about
their endogeneity, and later from the 1950s onward, as the arts of modeling error learning
and then the formation of rational expectations were mastered2
The interaction over time of macro-economic ideas with the facts that either refute
or render them temporarily irrelevant is also a two way affair, as I noted in David Laidler
(2003). Forward looking rational behaviour on the part of policy makers and private
agents alike must always be based on models – formal or informal - of the economic
environment in which they are operating and will therefore be conditioned by those
models. Ideas inconsistent with the way the economy actually works nevertheless affect
its performance, therefore, eventually in ways that produce unexpected results that reveal
the inconsistency in question. It is therefore hard to understand economic events, and
hence the very empirical basis of macro-economics itself, without also understanding
how the ideas that helped generate them evolved.
The current economic crisis is a prime example of a series of events grossly
inconsistent with the very macro-economic ideas that helped produce them, but these
happenings seem to bear a strong resemblance to those that three quarters of a century
ago provoked the "Keynesian Revolution". Prompted by these considerations, this paper
examines some of the relationships between macro-economic ideas and macro-economic
crises, both recent and n ot so recent. It first examines what Robert E. Lucas, who did as
2

. See fn. 11, p. 17 below for a further discussion of this point
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much as anyone to push the frontier of macro-economics to its current location, has had
to say about that frontier's relationship to real world economic phenomena, and also
about Keynes' place in the history of macro-economics Then it suggests that Lucas's
understanding of how economics has evolved is flawed, and that this accounts for his
equally flawed interpretation of Keynes' place in that history. It also considers some
implications for our understanding today's awkward economic facts of taking another
look at aspects of Keynes' General Theory, not so much its speculations about the role of
psychology and social conventions in the economic decisions of individual agents that
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009) have recently highlighted, however, as its
insights into the influence of the monetary and financial systems on the coordination of
these decisions.

II Lucas on Macro-economics and Keynes
Talking about "My Keynesian Education" at the 2003 HOPE conference on The IS-LM
Model: Its Rise, Fall, and Strange Persistence (Michel De Vroey and Kevin Hoover
2004) Lucas pointed, almost as an aside, to
the problem that the new theories, the theories embedded in general equilibrium
dynamics of the sort that we know how to use pretty well now – there's a residue
of things they don't let us think about. They don't let us think about the U.S.
experience in the 1930s or about financial crises and their real consequences in
Asian and Latin America, they don't let us think very well about Japan in the
1990s (2004, p 23)
This remark dates from 2003, when the final "Greenspan boom" was in full swing, and
the "residue" of problems to which Lucas referred did indeed seem rather remote from
the immediate but apparently well-established economic environment in which it was
made, and we should judge its offhand tone in this context. Viewed with hindsight,
though, the remark was ominous, because those same models now, in 2009, do not help
us to think about problems that are dominating the current evolution of the entire world
economy - some residue!3

3

Lucas's talk was not the only item produced in 2003 that should have indicated that something was amiss.
Michael's Woodford's magisterial book Interest and Prices – Foundations of the Theory of Monetary Policy
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Lucas (2004) also argued that Keynesian economics was equally unhelpful with
such issues, but here it is important to note that the "Keynesian economics" that formed
the basis of his education in the early 1960s can be summarized as IS-LM - albeit the
rather sophisticated version of it set out in Martin Bailey's (1962) textbook National
Income and the Price Level - plus large-scale econometric models, of which the then
emerging Brookings Model was something of a paradigm. This "Keynesian economics"
had evolved from The General Theory – whether legitimately or not - as a means of
coming to grips with, and designing policy to influence, the behaviour of real income and
employment, but in the early 1960s it had been extended to deal with inflation by the
addition of an analysis of exogenous "cost-push" factors, and/or a simple and apparently
permanent inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment – a Phillips curve.
When, at the decade's end, these modifications began to come to empirical grief in the
face of failed policy experiments that they themselves had helped inspire, a further patchup ensued. Endogenously determined, albeit adaptive, inflation expectations were
introduced into the Phillips curve, with Lucas himself, in co-operation with the Leonard
Rapping being a notable contributor to these early efforts – See Lucas and Rapping
1969). Although this simple modification, inspired by the work of Milton Friedman
(1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967), was more empirically helpful than is now commonly
believed,4 its deployment nevertheless came too late to save the day for the macroeconomics in which Lucas had been trained, because it did nothing to protect it from
deeper theoretical probing along two inter-related lines.
First, the fact that endogenous expectations had been evoked to make macroeconomic models work in an inflationary environment made it hard to avoid asking
whether simple adaptive formulae were the best that either economic agents or those
modeling their behaviour could do. Second, the Phillips curve had started out in A. W.
Phillips (1958) as an empirical relationship for which its creator had offered scant
also appeared that year, and if its apparently thorough index is to be believed, it mentions Japan's
experience in the 1990s twice in its 784 pages, financial markets once, and the "lender of last resort" not at
all. I take a certain degree of satisfaction in having argued at the time (See Laidler 2006) that Woodford's
analysis was well suited to the fair economic climate of a world dominated by successful inflation
targeting, but that in rougher weather its narrowness was likely to be a source of trouble, but I had no idea
then just how much trouble there was in store.
4
Despite the claims of Lucas and Thomas Sargent (1978) to the contrary. On this, see John Helliwell,
(2005-6)
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theoretical justification, but one important strand of the late 1960s literature, of which
Lucas and Rapping (1969) were also pioneers, grounded it in an analysis of the
economy's supply side that could be combined with the IS-LM system to form a highly
aggregated model of general economic equilibrium. Such a model clearly had to have
links to micro-economic general equilibrium analysis, and the exploration of these links
fitted naturally into a then already on-going search for the micro-foundations of macroeconomics.
As everyone knows, what was soon labeled new-classical economics emerged
largely from Lucas’s own efforts to come to grips with these two issues. Initially, it was
his replacement of adaptive by rational expectations that attracted most of the attention,
but the closely related explicit application to traditionally macro questions of micro
general equilibrium analysis marked a much more fundamental change in the then
dominant approach to macro-economics, because it broke the area's last remaining
intellectual links to Keynes' General Theory. Moreover, though Lucas’s contribution
launched a radically new vision of how a market economy functions, he himself thought
of it more modestly as involving the exploitation of newly available analytic techniques
to deal with age-old problems that the macro-economic theory of the 1960s and the
macro-econometrics that went with it had proved unable to address. Viewing the General
Theory through the prism created by this macro-economics, he saw it as having created
an unhelpful detour in the discipline’s otherwise orderly history, and interpreted its
temporary success as a consequence of the historical situation that had prompted its
writing.
In Lucas' view, Keynes had not advanced economics but had merely offered an ad
hoc political response to the circumstances of the Great Depression, a response which,
seen in relation to what Lucas believed to have been the already long-established internal
dynamic of economics, was of no lasting scientific value. In 2004, he made this point as
follows:
"Keynes's real contribution is . . .not Einstein-level theory, new paradigm, all this
. . ..that's just so much hot air. . . [I]n writing the General Theory, Keynes was
viewing himself as a spokesman for a discredited profession. . . .in a situation
where people are ready to throw in the towel on capitalism and liberal democracy
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and go with fascism or corporatism, protectionism, socialist planning. . . . What
he hits on is that the government should take on new responsibilities . . . for
stabilizing overall spending flows. . . . And . . . for everybody in the post-war
period – I'm talking about Keynesians and monetarists both – that's the agreed
upon view.. . .
So I think this was a great political achievement. It gave us a lasting
image of what we need economists for. I've been talking about the internal
mainstream of economics, that's what we researchers live on, but as a group we
have to earn our living by helping people diagnose situations that arise and
helping them understand what is going on and what we can do about it. That was
Keynes's whole life. He was a political activist from beginning to end. (2004,
pp 23-24)
I shall return below to the view of macro-economics' internal dynamic implicit in
this last this last paragraph. For the moment, though, note that Lucas is hardly the first
commentator on the General Theory to draw attention to its author's talents as a
polemicist, and to be led to dismiss that book's claims to scientific importance in the
process. The opening sentences of Pigou's (1936) review of the same book are justly
famous, at least among historians of economic thought
"When, in 1919, he wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Mr. Keynes
did a good day's work for the world, in helping it back towards sanity. But he did
a bad day's work for himself as an economist. For he discovered then, and his subconscious mind has not been able to forget since, that the best way to win
attention for one's own ideas is to present them in a matrix of sarcastic comment
upon other people" (p. 115)
And in 1936, as we all know, Pigou was no more appreciative of the General Theory as a
substantive contribution to economic analysis than Lucas would later be.
But Elizabeth Johnson (1978a and b), who was every bit as sensitive as Lucas to
Keynes's political agenda, without, however, at the same time dismissing his scientific
contributions, argued that we should pay attention to Keynes' skills as a writer if we are
fully to appreciate his economics, and nowhere did he make more careful use of these
than when he chose the titles of his books. Economic Consequences was indeed written to
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influence current policy. So were A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), The Means to
Prosperity (1933) and How to Pay for the War (1940), not to mention those occasional
pieces collected together as Essays in Persuasion (1931). Their author's purposes are
clearly expressed in the titles of these works. But A Treatise on Money (1930) and The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) signal altogether more
serious academic intentions. Pigou missed the point of the General Theory initially,
perhaps because he was hurt, and justifiably so, by its unfair attacks upon his own work,
but, with some acknowledged help from David Champernowne, he would later change
his mind about its scientific importance (See Pigou 1938). Lucas's views on these
matters, however, have not changed for three decades, most likely for two closely related
reasons, namely the logical structure of his own macro-economics, and his understanding
of the place of that macro-economics in the history of the subject.

III Lucas on Progress in Macroeconomic
The development of the expectations augmented Phillips curve in the late 1960s forced
increased attention to be paid to the properties of the supply side of macroeconomic
models, and one strand in the resulting literature treated the relationship itself as an
aggregate supply curve, along which, as Lucas (2004) points out with specific reference
to Lucas and Rapping's (1969) version of the analysis, "we have a cleared labor market at
every point in time" (p. 26). But as a simple matter of logic, the labour market can only
be cleared if the demanders of labour both expect to sell what labour produces and are
able to do so. Furthermore, the aggregate demand side of the economy to which Lucas
and Rapping thought their analysis was complementary was at that time invariably
modeled in IS-LM terms and had a postulate about supply side behaviour embedded in it,
namely, that what was demanded was also being produced, for how else could the
economy be on an IS-curve along which desired investment equaled desired saving?5
The aggregate demand and supply curves of the typical macroeconomic model of
around 1970s, that is to say, were not behaviour relationships, but equilibrium loci, and to
5

Thus the relationships between aggregate demand and the interest rate that are nowadays widely deployed
in monetary policy models should not be referred to as "optimizing IS curves". Rather they are structural
behaviour relationships. The apparently simple IS-LM model presents many pitfalls for the unwary who
were not brought up on it, as readers of the work of Ingo Barens (e.g.1999) on its history and logical
properties will be particularly aware.
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be on either, the economy had to be on both, that is in full equilibrium. However, the then
popular large scale quantitative versions of such models that had figured prominently in
Lucas' Keynesian education were made up of difference equations that not only tried to
deal with out-of-equilibrium adjustment processes, but were also estimated one at a time
and then brought together in systems which Lucas disparagingly but with some
justification compared to a "church supper" - "a completely crazy way to put together a
general equilibrium model of the whole economy. Nobody's thinking about the whole
thing" (2004, p. 21)
Lucas seems to have understood from a very early stage, however, that to bring
coherence to these models required more than merely an effort to think self consciously
about the "whole thing" when constructing them. He was familiar with Don Patinkin's
(1957) search for Walrasian foundations for Keynesian macroeconomics, and had noticed
that in the resulting systems, movements between equilibria occurred in real time as
prices that adjusted in accordance with what he refers to as the "mechanical auctioneer
dynamics that Samuelson introduced". As he pointed out in (2004), because "the rate of
change of price in any one market ought to depend on excess demand and supply in all
markets in the system" (p. 15) anything could happen in this process.6 Crucially also,
Lucas recognized that this characteristic had a counterpart in those abovementioned
difference-equation-based macro-econometric models into which "Keynesian theory . . .
[had breathed] some economic life". To match the data they relied on inter-equilibria
adjustment processes characterized by parameters whose values were left to be
determined freely by those data, and as a result they could explain (almost – sometimes
there were sign or magnitude restriction) anything and therefore (almost) nothing As he
put it in his Nobel Lecture (Lucas, 1996, p.252), "The dynamics had a kind of patched in
quality, fitting the facts, but only in a manner that suggests they could equally well fit any
facts" And to complete this unsatisfactory picture, the expectations that implicitly or
explicitly entered into determining the behaviour described by the individual equations of
these models were routinely unrelated to the outcomes generated by the models
themselves.

6

As, according to Lucas, Milton Friedman had already pointed out to Patinkin,
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In (2004), Lucas described the development of macro-economics once these
problems were recognized as involving the replacement of this Keynesian economics, in
which he had initially been educated,
by the Arrow-Debreu model, which shows how you can take what seems to be a
static general equilibrium model and talk about markets for contingent claims,
talk about any kind of dynamics you'd like, coming right out of the economics.
No auctioneer, or the auctioneer worked very quickly . . . we didn't know this
theory existed back in 1960 although it did. But now its potential is getting
realized. It has completely succeeded in taking over growth theory, most of public
finance, financial economics. Now it's coming in use in macroeconomics with real
business cycle theory; certain kinds of monetary variations have been introduced
with success . . . (p. 23)
This of course is the approach that doesn't let us think about that "residue of
things" which includes financial crises and the depression; but it is even more limiting
than that. It is also makes it hard for its exponents to double back to the insights of an
earlier era in economics for help with this problem because the most important of those
insights were into the workings of economies in whose description that phrase deployed
by Lucas - "no auctioneer" - is to be taken literally, so that the agents operating within
them must themselves set the prices at which they then trade. An economy with "No
auctioneer" is thus not the same as one presided over by a "very quick" auctioneer,
because when the latter sets the prices of future goods and/or state contingent claims on
them alongside those of current goods, he reduces the logic of "any kind of dynamics you
like" to that of a static general equilibrium model and precludes the possibility of trade
and production happening at non-market-clearing prices, something that is all too likely
to happen in his absence..
As some extremely distinguished exponents of the Arrow-Debreu model – for
example Frank Hahn (e.g. 1982) - have argued, this quick auctioneer's activities render
such an economy crucially different from any that we might encounter in the real world,
not least because they eliminate any essential role for money in its processes of price
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formation or exchange.7 The market mechanisms embedded in the Arrow Debreu model
are thus at best a metaphor for the monetary and financial systems through which
exchange among agents both at a moment in time and over time is mediated in the real
world. It is because financial crises involve failures of the latter systems that models
which analyze only situations in which they are working cannot be of any help in
understanding these events.
This does not in and of itself make dynamic general equilibrium models bad
economics, because to resort to a metaphor is merely to say that one thing behaves "as if"
it were another. Many of us are quite comfortable with empirically testing "as if"
statements about how the economy functions, tentatively accepting them if they seem to
be useful and otherwise rejecting them. Some of us are even willing to deploy particular
already well-tested "as if" hypotheses in contexts where they seem likely to work, though
we also know that in others they don’t. Dynamic general equilibrium modeling in macroeconomics, of the type that that began with Lucas's (1972) "money-supply surprise"
model, could, and still can, therefore, be defended on an "as if" basis as one potentially
useful approach among others, even if limited in its applicability. Indeed in some places
from the early 1990s until recently, such an approach – essentially that codified by
Woodford (2003) - provided a very useful framework for monetary policy making, But,
as a matter of fact, since the mid-1970s, the market-clearing postulate has often been
treated by its exponents, not as a refutable conjecture about how economies might
helpfully be modeled in some circumatances, but as an axiom, alongside that of rational
maximizing behaviour, upon whose acceptance the admissibility of any model into the
ranks of what is then worth testing depends.8

7

Although "certain kinds of monetary variations" – cash in advance, over-lapping generations models, or
simply a money stock that responds passively to the demand for money, though Lucas does not itemize
these – have been indeed introduced into such analysis, it is not clear by what criteria the success he claims
for these exercises should be judged.
8
This author tried, without much success to start a debate about the empirical weaknesses of the moneysupply surprise model of the cycle from the late 1970s onwards, drawing attention in particular to that
model’s inconsistency with one of the best established sets of stylized facts in economics, namely that
variations in money growth precede those in output, which in turn precede those in the inflation rate See
for example Laidler (1982) Lucas himself does not seem to have acknowledged the model’s empirical
difficulties, and the impetus they had given to real business cycle theory, until his (1996) Nobel Prize
lecture. Recently, in a 2009 lecture offering an interpretation of today's crisis in terms of a framework that
harks back to Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) treatment of the Great Depression, he remarks "But we don't
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One can see why well articulated micro-economic foundations began to take such
strong precedence over empirical evidence in macroeconomics in the early 1970s. After
all, a permanent inflation-unemployment trade-off had been presented as a well
established fact in the preceding decade and had quickly found a central place not just in
the text-books, but in the policy debates of the period too, but Phelps and Friedman had
challenged its authority with a priori micro-economic reasoning before the empirical
counter-examples that confirmed their skepticism had been generated. Once inflation
began to generate these counter-examples in the early 1970s, however, it became patently
obvious that the careful deductive analysis of rational behaviour had been a better guide
to assessing propositions about real world economies than had empirical generalizations
with no obvious basis in such reasoning.
Even so, the temptation to draw general conclusions about how to proceed with
macro-economic modeling from examples such as this has its dangers. The rational
maximization postulate is most easily deployed in macro-economics by adopting the
"representative agent" simplification to dispose of all the many complications that
disparities and interactions among multiple agents can create for the analysis of aggregate
behaviour. When such models are extended to multiple-agent formulations, the
assumption of continuously clearing markets plays the apparently primarily technical role
of enabling the analysis to continue to focus on rational maximizing behaviour, and in
particular on the formulation and use of rational expectations to guide it.9
But in fact, this assumption of clearing markets, technically useful though it
certainly is, is also of immense substantive significance. To treat it as an axiom rather
than an empirical hypothesis is to do nothing less than resolve by assumption, and hence
place beyond debate, two of the oldest and most contentious questions in the history of
economics, namely whether, and if so how, a decentralized market economy is capable of
coordinating the individual consumption and production decisions of those who
have a reliable way to predict how spending changes break down into price effects and production effects".
I am grateful to Russell Boyer for drawing my attention to this lecture.
9

And of course, in empirical work the representative agent assumption permits cross equation constraints
to be imposed upon the model's behaviour, whether it is to be tested by estimation or calibration. I am
unaware of any arguments, either theoretical or empirical that support such a style of modeling to the
exclusion of other less exacting procedures. Of course, there can be no harm in imposing such constraints
on a "as if" basis as a prelude to testing their validity. What is wrong is to insist on them.
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participate in it. Only the answers "yes" to the first and "as if by agents who respond to
the market clearing prices posted by an auctioneer who works very quickly" to the second
are admissible. Other responses, such as "sometimes" and "by indirect exchange
mediated by monetary and financial systems that are subject to failure from time to time",
let alone any more radical suggestions that might boil down to "never", are ruled out.
But, in Lucas's view the deployment of Arrow-Debreu analysis represents nothing
more (nor less) than the fulfillment of what was always the goal of a long line of
theorists, stretching from David Hume to Patinkin who, wanting ". . . to think in general
equilibrium terms . . . resort to disequilibrium dynamics only because the analytic
equipment available to them offers no alternative" (1996, p. 253). Or, as he put it in
(2004)
I see the progressive . . . element in economics as entirely technical: better
mathematics, better mathematical formulation, better data, better data-processing
methods, better statistical methods, better computational methods, I think of all
progress in economic thinking, in the kind of basic core of economic theory as
developing entirely as learning how to do what Hume, and Smith and Ricardo
wanted to do, only better. (2004, p.22)
However, as we have seen, no theoretical system based on the assumption of
continuously clearing markets – and this is true even of those mislabeled "new
Keynesians" models deployed for example by Woodford (2003) in which money-wage
and nominal price adjustment is slowed down by arbitrarily introduced overlapping
contracts – can deal with some of the critical monetary and financial features of any real
world economy.10 It is not just that such macroeconomic models cannot address the
policy issues that the recent convulsions in financial markets have created, though they
can't, but rather that it is difficult for anyone brought up under their influence even to
conceive of such events occurring in the first place. That is why a crisis in macroeconomics is an integral part of the current economic situation.
.

10

This is indeed to suggest that Lucas has misread the intentions of Hume, Smith, Ricardo et al., as Mark
Blaug (2001) argued at much greater length.
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IV Keynes as an Alleged Scientific Outlier
The extent to which modern economic theory has contributed to the upheavals that began
to shake economies in 2007 is a problem for future economic historians and historians of
economic thought to worry about. For today's economists, or at least those who take the
subject's past seriously, a more immediate question is where in that past we might look
for guidance as we try to reconfigure its future.
One answer already widely on offer, not least from Akerlof and Shiller (2009) is
the Keynesian Revolution of the late 1930s. Somewhat paradoxically, although these
authors have a high opinion of Keynes as an economist, their assessment of the facts of
his place in the history of macroeconomics is very similar to Lucas's. They too treat him
as an outlier who tried and failed to divert economics from a continuously developing
orthodoxy that could be traced back to Adam Smith and the other founders of Classical
economics. As they describe that orthodoxy,
According to traditional economics, free market capitalism will be essentially
perfect and stable . . . This line of reasoning goes back to Adam Smith . . . If
people rationally pursue their own economic interests in such markets, they will
exhaust all mutually beneficial opportunities to produce goods and exchange with
one another [and this] results in full employment" (2009. p.2)
And of course at least one other authority took a similar view of Keynes' place in
the history of economic thought even before the publication of the General Theory,
namely its author. Recall that famous letter to George Bernard Shaw, later quoted on the
back cover of the "Papermac" edition of the book in question: " . . .you have to know that
I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely revolutionise
[sic] – not, I suppose at once but in the course of the next ten years – the way the world
thinks about economic problems"; but note also that the General Theory's own account
of "Classical economics" was castigated by Pigou (1936) as "a macedoine of
misrepresentation", and that another reviewer, Frank H. Knight (1937) described Keynes'
treatment of it in the following similar, if more even- tempered, terms:
the references under this phrase are the sort of caricatures, which are typically set
up as straw men for purposes of attack in controversial writing . . . the reader of
Mr. Keynes's [sic] book would do well to keep in mind that references to
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"classical economics" are to be interpreted as relating to economic analysis at the
stage at which uncertainty and monetary disturbances are assumed absent" (1937,
p. 101)
This judgment is surely right, for though Keynes did have interesting and
sometimes novel things to say about "uncertainty and monetary disturbances", it is by
now a commonplace of the history of macroeconomic thought that he systematically
downplayed the fact that so did many of his then academically respectable
contemporaries and predecessors. It is worrisome therefore that, at a time when the subdiscipline is having so much difficulty coping with empirical puzzles that seem to be
associated with these very phenomena, important theorists like Akerlof and Shiller, and
of course Lucas, remain content to take Keynes' own account of his place in that history
at face value.

V Some Psychological Components of Keynes' Macro-economics
In Animal Spirits Akerlof and Shiller invoke Keynes' name and vocabulary mainly as
rhetorical devices in support of the view that macroeconomics should take a little more
notice of psychology and rely somewhat less on utility maximizing hypotheses. The
ultimate test of their claims here must be whether they help us to understand the world we
live in better than the alternative, and on this question I am willing to suspend judgment
pending the outcome of further empirical investigations. But, though it is certainly true
that there is much in the General Theory that derives from Keynes' own keen interest in
psychology, a point often stressed by Gilles Dostaler – most recently in (2007, Ch. 6) not all of the precedents for such an approach on display in the General Theory are
encouraging.
To begin with, Keynes invoked not maximizing behaviour but psychology to get
the stable marginal propensity to consume that he needed to generate a stable multiplier,
which was both a useful simplification to deploy in his explanation of unemployment as a
consequence of deficient private investment and a crucial lynchpin for his policy
recommendation that this gap could be filled by public expenditure. He told his readers
that though the "propensity to consume" was influenced by both subjective and objective
factors, the former, namely "those psychological characteristics of human nature, . . .
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social practices and institutions . . . though not unalterable . . .are unlikely to undergo a
material change over a short period of time, except in abnormal or revolutionary
circumstances" so that, ultimately
The fundamental psychological law, upon which we are entitled to depend with
great confidence both a priori from our knowledge of human nature and from the
detailed facts of experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule and on average, to
increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the
increase in their income. (1936, p. 98)
As Allan Hynes (1998) has documented, however, this building block of The General
Theory, which Bertil Ohlin had criticized as an over-simplification as early as (1937),
began to crack under the weight of empirical evidence in the early 1940s and was
ultimately replaced by the utility-maximizing models of Franco Modigliani and Richard
Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957)
Or to cite another example, Allan Meltzer (1988, p.146) has drawn attention to
Keynes's way of switching between extrapolative and regressive hypotheses about
interest-rate expectations, not least as the needs of his case changed between the Treatise
on Money (1930) and the General Theory. In the Treatise, when discussing the use of
monetary policy to influence the long-term rate of interest in order to offset the effects on
investment of swings in "the spirit of enterprise", he argued that the short interest rates
that the central bank could undoubtedly influence "affect long rates more than one might
expect" because "mob psychology" - at first sight an unreliable foundation for monetary
policy - in fact provided the basis for "a homeopathic cure , , ,The real prospects do not
suffer such large and quick changes as does the spirit of enterprise" so "it is not
unreasonable to depend on short-period influences for counteracting a violent, and
perhaps unreasoning change in sentiment" In the General Theory, on the other hand,
though Keynes still presented that same long rate of interest as "a highly psychological
phenomenon" he quickly qualified this characterization by suggesting that it was "more
accurately . . . a highly conventional . . .phenomenon . . ." which would sometimes be
impervious to monetary policy because
"Any level of interest which is accepted with sufficient conviction as likely to be
durable will be durable; subject of course, in a changing society to fluctuations for
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all kinds of reasons round the expected normal. . . . it may fluctuate for decades
about a level which is chronically too high for full employment . . ." (italics in
original)
As to swings in the above-mentioned "spirit of enterprise", which had already
appeared, though not under that label, in the work of Lavington (1922) and Pigou
(eg.1927) as driven by cumulative and contagious "errors of optimism and pessimism",
these would reappear in the General Theory as consequences of exogenous changes in
"animal spirits" that are there presented as more important determinants of the marginal
efficiency of capital than any "weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities" (p. 161) Now Roger Backhouse and Laidler (2004) among
others have followed Jan Kregel (1976) in pointing out that Keynes' treatment of long
term expectations about the profitability of investment as exogenous enabled him to
develop an essentially comparative static and hence analytically manageable framework
to expound the central theme of the General Theory, namely that it is changes in
expectations about the future which largely cause variations in the present level of
employment, so this was surely a fruitful and productive simplification.11 But though
Keynes had many amusing things to say about the gyrations of the "spirit of enterprise"
and its interactions with what he called "speculation" in his Chapter 12 on "The State of
Long-term Expectation", the fact remains that in accounting for swings in investment by
attributing them to exogenous changes in "animal spirits" (or to exogenous changes in
anything else for that matter) he left them entirely unexplained.
Now Keynes was not the first economist to appeal to psychology when lacking an
explanation for seemingly important facts: There is, for example, more psychology and
11

. Before 1930 there had actually been some non-trivial discussions by Gunnar Myrdal (1927) and Eric
Lindahl (1929) of rational forward looking expectations as determinants of current behaviour, which, for
want of any means of analyzing these interactions, had given way to ideas about endogenously determined
extrapolative expectations. But, as Bjorn Hansson (1982) documents, when embedded in dynamic "model
sequences" these too had proved analytically complex and unmanageable and had yielded little in the way
of definite results. Others would soon formalize Keynes' essentially static framework into the IS-LM model
which was not only technically accessible to the average professional economist of the period, but also
yielded clear-cut and above all easily taught results, not least about the effects of shifts of the IS curve on
real income, and hence by implication, employment. This was hardly a be-all and end-all as far as modeling
the role of expectations in the macro-economy was concerned, but it was nevertheless the best that could be
done at the time. Given generally available analytic techniques in the late 1930s, therefore,, to make
expectations exogenous was actually a progressive step, and it was only in the third quarter of the century
that most economists mastered the methods that permitted more subtle ideas to be explored productively.
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less rational maximization at the heart of the Wealth of Nations (1776) than either Lucas
or Akerlof and Shiller seem willing to concede. Adam Smith even invoked an inherent
"propensity to truck and barter" to explain the phenomenon of exchange itself. Nor was
Keynes the last, asAkerlof and Shiller's own example shows. But even given the
advances that the latter tell us have been made since 1936 in the course of a further
seventy years work on the idea of "animal spirits" (See, p. xi), one wonders whether their
optimistic claim that the modern version of this concept provides "easy answers" to the
eight undoubtedly important economic questions which their book addresses is
justified.12 Perhaps such answers are just a bit too easy when it is permissible to cast them
in terms of behavioural hypotheses that, not being firmly grounded in rational
maximization, can be custom-tailored to the relevant facts.

VI Keynes on Money and Coordination
Keynes' deployment of exogenous long-term expectations to permit the analytic
simplifications needed to generate a coherent theory of employment provides compelling
support for Lucas's views on the role of analytic techniques as limiting factors in the
development of economic theory, and subsequent developments in the treatment of
expectations just as surely illustrate his contentions about the importance of purely
technical advances in the permitting theory to move forward. As we have seen, however,
Lucas goes beyond such claims. He explicitly treats technical advances as in and of
themselves defining theoretical progress, and he implicitly treats that progress as coming
at no cost. If he is right here, any doubling back of economic thought to the 1930s, or any
other era, is unnecessary, now or at any other time.
Akerlof and Shiller clearly reject this viewpoint, but it is not necessary to share
their enthusiasm for psychology in general or "animal spirits" in particular, to agree with
their broader judgment. As Backhouse and Laidler (2004) pointed out, much else besides
Keynes' deployment of psychological ideas became hidden from view as IS-LM based
12

These questions, whose specifics need not concern us here, are listed by them on page 6 of their book.
Note that, as Peter Howitt has suggested to me, some at least of the differences between Akerlof and
Shiller's ideas about "animal spirits" and those of Keynes stem from their habit of using the phrase to
characterize any deviation of economic agents' motivation from the rational maximizing norm of neoclassical economics, whereas Keynes used it to refer only to what he elsewhere termed the "spirit of
enterprise" among investors.
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macro-economics cast its ever deepening shadow over macro-economic in the 1940s and
'50s. This is not to argue that such economics was not legitimately derived from the
General Theory.13 But it is to argue that there was much else both in that book, and in the
literature in whose context it should be read, that did not find its way into the so-called
Keynesian education of Lucas and of most of his contemporaries.
In particular Keynes attributed an utterly central role to money in his new theory
of how the economy functioned. Readers of his Preface were told that
. . . whilst … money enters into the economic scheme in an essential and peculiar
manner, technical monetary detail falls into the background A monetary
economy, we shall find, is one in which changing views about the future are
capable of influencing the quantity of employment and not merely its
direction. (p. vii)
Even so, had the General Theory said no more than that the key to macro-economic
instability was to be found in the workings of the monetary system, this would not have
set it apart from a host of other writings of the period. John Stuart Mill's insights into the
way an excess supply of output as a whole could arise as a counterpart to an excess
demand for money in times of crisis first appeared in a rather obscure paper published in
(1844) but written in the late 1820s, but they were also set out in his Principles (1848),
and were taken up in due course by Alfred Marshall and Mary Marshall (1879). In the
inter-war years, much developed, they were on prominent display in Ralph Hawtrey's (eg.
1919, 1932) work. Furthermore, as Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) has documented so
persuasively, Knut Wicksell's (1898) analysis of how an interest rate determined within
the monetary system might disrupt capital markets' ability to maintain equilibrium
between saving and investment inspired a lively and diverse subsequent literature from
which Keynes' own Treatise on Money drew much of its inspiration. By 1936, that is to
say, the literature of macro-economics was dominated, not by the view that the economy
could be analyzed "as if" functioning by barter, but by a bewildering variety of efforts,

13

A comparison of Chapter 18 of that book - "The General Theory of Employment re-stated" with Hick's
famous (!937) article will provide ample evidence that it was, while Patinkin (1990) provides a much more
elaborate statement of the case for regarding IS-LM as conveying a – he would surely have said the –
legitimate account of the book's central message.
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each in its own way unsatisfactory, to articulate just what it was about money that made
an economy that used it different in general, and crisis prone in particular.
As I argued in Laidler (1999), there was therefore nothing original about this
question when the General Theory posed it, nor were any of the concepts Keynes
deployed in formulating his particular response new. The multiplier was borrowed from
Richard Kahn (1931) and Jens Warming (1932), the "marginal efficiency of capital" from
Fisher (1907) - where it was called the "rate of return over cost" - while "liquidity
preference" – also a new name for an older idea – came from Frederick Lavington
(1921) by way of Keynes's own earlier Treatise on Money and John Hicks (1935).
What was new in (1936) was a uniquely powerful and coherent synthesis of these
ideas. The point of liquidity preference theory was that money, whose use as a means of
exchange and unit of account made coordinated economic activity feasible in the first
place, also could and did function as a store of value along-side claims to the income
streams generated by capital goods.14 Thus
The psychological time-preferences of an individual require two distinct
sets of decisions to carry them out completely. The first is concerned with that
aspect of time-preference which . . . determines how much of his income he will
consume and how much he will reserve in some form of command over future
consumption.
But this decision having been made, there is a further decision . . . namely
in what form he will hold the command over future consumption which he has
reserved, whether out of his current income or from previous savings. Does he
want to hold it in the form of immediate, liquid command (i.e. in money or its
equivalent)? Or is he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or
indefinite period, leaving it to future market conditions to determine on what
terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred command over specific goods into
immediate command over goods in general? (p. 166)

14

Akerlof and Shiller make much of the potential for money's unit of account role to create "money
illusion" and hence to cause departures from rational behaviour. Without wishing to commit myself here
either against or for their particular applications of this idea to current macroeconomic issues, let me record
my judgment that they overstate role played by this idea in the General Theory's analysis of the importance
of money. See also below, p. 22.
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In the "as if" model of a barter economy that Keynes misleadingly identified as
representing the sum total of classical economics, the rate of interest has only one
function, to equilibrate the first of the abovementioned decisions with the investment
choices of firms. But, he argued, a monetary economy is not an "as if barter" economy
precisely because, when money can be held as a store of value, the rate of interest also
acquires a crucial role in portfolio allocation decisions, which may undermine its capacity
simultaneously to coordinate the allocation of resources over time.
Keynes posited the logical possibility of co-ordination failures in a monetary
economy, not their logical necessity, however, and he went to considerable trouble to
describe the circumstances under which a monetary economy would converge on an
equilibrium in which what he called the "neutral" rate of interest – that which would
equate saving and investment at a full employment level of income - would prevail.
However, writing as he was in the mid 1930s (and recall that in his native Britain, mass
unemployment had been chronic since 1921) it was nevertheless reasonable for him
conclude that at least some of many factors to which he could point as making this
outcome unlikely had in fact prevailed, and to suggest both a diagnosis of the depression,
and policy remedies for it.
The General Theory's treatment of these issues will seem to many nowadays both
dated and politically naive15: It attributes the depression of its times to a chronic lack of
investment opportunities that are privately profitable even at a low positive value of the
long term rate of interest, this state of affairs being caused in turn by a secular slowdown
in technical progress which was expected to persist into the foreseeable future; it then
suggests remedies that require some permanent changes in economic and social
organization: "a much lower rate of interest than has ruled hitherto", a "state of affairs . . .
quite compatible with some measure of individualism, yet it would mean the euthanasia
of the rentier" (p 375-6), not to mention a "somewhat comprehensive socialization of
investment" (p. 378).

15

Though Roger Backhouse has rightly warned me that much of this impression stems from viewing the
book from the stand-point of today's political and economic orthodoxy, which is of relatively recent origin.
It is worth speculating that, when the dust created by the present crisis has settled, a different perspective
on some of these matters might emerge.
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We might conjecture that the clearly political content of these recommendations
combined with the dramatic flair with which they were advanced as seeming ". . . to a
nineteenth-century publicist or to a contemporary American financier to be a terrific
encroachment on individualism" (p 380) were what helped to convince Lucas that their
author's theoretical ideas could be of no account for the development of scientific
economics. But, as Patinkin (1983) pointed out in the course of his critique of Meltzer's
(1981) "different perspective" on the General Theory, that book's final Chapter 24, in
which these ideas appear, is not a conventional closing summary of a scientific
monograph dedicated to expounding a new theory, but merely "Concluding notes on the
Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might lead"(italics added).
Even Keynes, that is to say, knew that the political appendages of the General
Theory were not logically implied by its theoretical economic content, but by certain
empirical judgments with which he supplemented the book's analytic framework. But
claims on behalf of the importance and originality of that theoretical economic content
are not, as Lucas would have them, "hot air". That "general theory" to which the book's
title alludes is, after all, a systematic and successful effort to show why the logic of a
monetary economy cannot in general be reduced to that of an economy in which, to
borrow Lucas's terminology, a very quick auctioneer is always at work, and how that
economy's distinguishing monetary characteristics render it prone to co-ordination
failures. Furthermore, as Peter Howitt has argued in a number of places (eg. 1995, 2006),
the logic of macroeconomic systems that rely on an auctioneer to support the interlinked
hypotheses of clearing markets and rational expectations cannot be extended to
encompass such failures. If therefore, as Lucas would have us do, we treat the differences
between these two classes of models as reflecting not the presence of different
substantive and testable "as-if" hypotheses about the way in which economies actually
function, but simply the technical superiority of one of them, which we are then bound to
choose, we not only find ourselves unable to think about co-ordination failures, but we
also rule out any efforts to do so as scientifically retrogressive.
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VII The General Theory's Current Relevance
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money is not a treatise on the overall
anatomy of economic crises. Though it does have things to say about their origins, it is
primarily about why they involve unemployment, and what might be done about this, and
it is with these same issues that it is most likely to be helpful today. Keynes argued that
an understanding of monetary matters was essential to grasping how the level of
employment could sometimes be deficient, that this very understanding implied that wage
and price flexibility, which operated through its effects on the monetary system, could
not and should not be relied on to restore it to a satisfactory level, and also that
expansionary monetary policy might sometimes be of limited usefulness for this purpose.
It is convenient to take up the role of price flexibility, or the lack thereof, in the
story first of all. Pace Akerlof and Shiller and a host of others, the significance of price
stickiness for a monetary economy does not rest in any essential way on money illusion,
contractually determined money wage rigidities or any other such dei ex machina.
Rather, as only became entirely clear in the 1960s from the work of Robert Clower
(1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968), it derives from the more fundamental fact that, though
in such an economy variations in the general price level are required to keep the supply
and demand for money in equilibrium at full employment, there is no auctioneer present
to set this variable's value16. Its behaviour is therefore the aggregate byproduct of the
activities of a host of individual agents, each of whom sets the nominal price of whatever
is traded in his or her own market with no regard to that aggregate outcome. These agents
can bring as much (or little) flexibility and rationality to these activities as we care to
attribute to them, but just so long as they do not always make exactly the right array of
decisions to keep the overall price level at its market-clearing value, then trading at false
prices will take place in some markets, with consequences for subsequent decisions about
quantities whose aggregate outcomes may sometimes look like multiplier processes.
Not that Keynes in any case regarded a degree of price level stickiness as a
drawback in a monetary economy. On the contrary, he clearly believed that the
16

The work of Clower and Leijonhufvud' on the market-theoretic foundations of Keynesian macroeconomics of the late 1960s was eclipsed by the success of Lucas's new-classical approach to the same
issues, unfortunately so in my view. For a fuller discussion of its place in the history of macro-economics,
see Laidler (2009). Note that there was also what we might call a "monetarist" branch to this line of
thought, See, for example, Karl Brunner and Meltzer (1971) and Laidler (1974)

23

predictability in nominal values that it brought with it helped to make rational decisions
possible, and from the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) to How to Pay for the War
(1940), he was a firm advocate of price level stability as a policy goal. This was his
position in the General Theory as well, even in the face of employment problems
. . .the chief result of . . .[money wage flexibility] would be to cause a great
instability of prices, so violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in
an economic society functioning after the manner of that in which we live. To
suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system . . .
which on the whole is one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth (p.269)
But when it came to explaining the possibility of unemployment arising, and warning
about limits on the efficacy of monetary cures for this state of affairs, Keynes emphasized
not price stickiness per se but money's capacity to satisfy liquidity preference, though of
course this did derive from its role in the processes of price formation and exchange that
price stability helped support..
According to Keynes, The basic reason that unemployment could arise was that,
to use a more modern terminology than he deployed himself, liquidity preference
interfered with the rate of interest's ability to keep the allocation of resources over time
coordinated in the face of changing investment and saving decisions, thus forcing it to
abdicate this task to movements in income and employment; and monetary cures for
unemployment were unreliable because the sensitivity of the demand for money to the
rate of interest might place limits on the expansionary impact of increases in real
balances, even when these were brought about directly by policy-induced increases in the
supply of nominal balances, rather than price level variations.
Keynes' claims on behalf of the novelty and importance of these implications of
his monetary theory of the rate of interest generated much immediate criticism, and the
ensuing debate established a point that is crucially relevant to today's policy debates:
namely that, though his explanation of how variations in employment could occur and
his speculations about the weakness of monetary stabilizing measures are linked to one
another by his insights into the unique nature of a monetary economy, one can accept the
former without also assenting to the latter. Dennis Robertson (1936), Jacob Viner (1936)
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and Hawtrey (1937) each in his own way took this position, and there is a lot to be said
for it.
The key point here is that the interest sensitivity of the demand for money must be
non trivial for a monetary economy to generate lapses from high employment in the face
of shocks to saving and investment, but it needs to be very high to support doubts about
the effectiveness of monetary stimulus in the face of such lapses. There is much less
empirical evidence to support this latter position than the former. That is why Keynes'
claims about the importance of liquidity preference as the key to co-ordination failures
that can generate unemployment are still worth taking seriously, while his doubts about
monetary policy as a cure for them are more questionable. Though he was himself
ambivalent about the empirical relevance of that extreme case which Dennis Robertson
later called the liquidity trap, there is ample textual evidence that he believed liquidity
preference usually to be highly interest sensitive and unstable as well, a matter that
Friedman (1974) in particular emphasized when he denied that his demand for money
function was not so much a restated quantity theory as a development of Keynes'
monetary theory 17
If one can accept Keynes; view of the monetary roots of unemployment without
being obliged to accept his skepticism about the efficacy of monetary remedies for it.,
this still leaves open questions about the adequacy of the explanations on offer in the
General Theory for the onset of a crisis like today's. There is much that is attractive here:
not least the parallel between Keynes' paradoxical proposition, already explored at length,
that the very institution of monetary exchange that makes a market economy possible
also renders it vulnerable to failure, and his equally paradoxical argument that the modern
financial markets that do so much to mobilize savings and make them available for

17

Furthermore, many contemporary commentators shared his views that experience in 1932 in the US had
demonstrated at least the temporary impotence of monetary measures. Not all of them did, however, –
Lauchlin Currie (1934) being notable among the dissenters - while the much later work of Friedman and
Anna Schwartz (1963) and of Allan Meltzer (2003) has by now made dissent from Keynes' skepticism on
this point something closer to a majority view Not a universal one, though, for Paul Krugman (eg 2007) is
an important dissenter, but since his case for the liquidity trap's existence, as set out in (e.g. 1999) is a
purely deductive one, based on a model rigged to produce an L shaped demand for money function by
making this demand depend purely on an arbitrarily imposed cash-in-advance constraint while introducing
a bond into the system that is a perfect substitute for money as a store of value, it is hard to know what to
make of this dissent.
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investment, also undermine the rationality of the latter activity.18 As he put it: "The
social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and
ignorance which envelop our future. The actual private object of the most skilled
investment today is to "beat the gun" as the Americans so well express it, to outwit the
crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half crown to the other fellow" (p. 155). And
his recognition that "these tendencies are a scarcely avoidable outcome of having
successfully organized 'liquid' investment markets" did not soften his judgment that
"when the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a
casino, the job is likely to be ill done" (p.159)
It is hard to deny that all this has considerable contemporary resonance in 2009,
or to fail to recognize that Hyman Minsky's (e.g 1982) nowadays finally popular analysis
of financial markets' tendencies to develop into gigantic Ponzi schemes has some of its
roots here. But Keynes' analysis is nevertheless incomplete, as has already been noted
above. His insights into the role of financial markets in detaching investment decisions
from fundamentals notwithstanding, a spontaneous collapse in animal spirits and hence in
the marginal efficiency of capital and in investment expenditure is more an ex post
rationalization of an economic crisis than an explanation for it, and it also leaves too
many facts unaccounted for. That is why, as I have explained at greater length in Laidler
(2007), I find analyses of booms and their collapse into financial crisis along Austrian –
See e.g. Friedrich von Hayek (1929), and Roger Garrison (2001) – or Robertsonian – See
e.g. Robertson (1928) - lines more satisfactory, inasmuch in particular as these find a
place for the incomplete capital expenditure projects that, as an empirical matter, always
seem to be left behind by these events; and if forced to refine this choice further, I would
opt for Robertson, who avoided Hayek's tendency towards policy nihilism about how to
deal with the subsequent slump because he had a better appreciation of the fact that
bubbles are primarily sectoral in nature, even though the consequences of their collapse
may often be economy-wide..
Even so, my skepticism about the adequacy of Keynes' views on monetary policy,
and on the causes of crises notwithstanding, I hope that it is clear from the foregoing
discussion that his interpretation of falling income and employment as a monetary
18

I am grateful to Harald Hagemann for suggesting that I address these issues.
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economy's way of moving saving and investment back towards equilibrium when its
mechanisms prevent the rate of interest from doing the trick is as relevant today as it was
in 1936, and an idea that modern macroeconomics would do well to revive. 19

VIII Summarizing Keynes' Contemporary Significance
Lucas (2004) described Keynes's response to the depression as that of a political activist
whose claims to have contributed to economic theory were unsustainable. And yet Lucas
was not willing to argue that Keynes' influence was over, because further progress along
"the internal mainstream of economics . . . that . . . we researchers live on", whose flow
Keynes had temporarily interrupted, had not yet produced an adequate treatment of
matters related to monetary instability. "Some people just deny that there are real effects
of monetary instability, but I think that it is just a mistake" and in any event, researchers
"as a group . . . have to earn our living by helping people diagnose situations that arise
and helping them understand what is going on and what we can do about it"
While waiting for the above-mentioned "internal mainstream" to produce relevant
results, therefore, Lucas seems willing, when discussing current policy as he does in a
recent lecture (2009), to offer analysis in the spirit he attributes to Keynes, and also to
Friedman, whose approach he doesn't find too different (see 2004, p.24).20 But, as I
argued at the outset of this paper, the mainstream of macro-economics does not follow a
straight line characterized by purely technical advances. It is much more wayward, and
sometimes encounters empirical obstacles sufficiently strong to divert its course and even
turn it temporarily back on itself in search of theoretical ideas that have been prematurely
mislaid in the face of changing policy problems or inadequacies of available analytic
techniques.
Today's economic crisis is just such an obstacle, and my main purpose in this
paper has been to argue that it calls for a reconsideration of Keynes's insights into the
19

This is not to say that explanations of the onset of the current crisis along Keynes' (or Minsky's) lines
would lack a respectable pedigree: see Michael Lawlor (2006), for example on the nature and origins of
Keynes' views on the functioning of financial markets.
20
Roger Backhouse has correctly pointed out to me that many other earlier commentators – eg. Johnson
(1971), Patinkin (1974) - have noted affinities between the approaches taken by Keynes and Friedman to
economics, but when Lucas does so, this is nevertheless of more than routine significance, for in doing so,
he implicitly differentiates his own approach from Friedman's, thus casting doubt on the appropriateness of
James Tobin's (1981) characterization of New-classical economics as "Monetarism Mark 2"
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mechanics of inter-temporal co-ordination in a monetary economy and their proneness to
occasional failure. More generally, because I have also argued that this exercise will not
even be attempted by exponents of a macro-economics that insists on beginning
everything from the assumption that markets clear continuously, I have also implied that
it is not just Keynes' specific answer that nowadays needs reconsideration, but perhaps
even more so, the basic question that he shared with his contemporaries: namely, what is
it about a monetary economy that sometimes causes its coordination mechanisms to break
down? Perhaps Lucas's recent ventures into "helping people diagnose . . . and understand
what is going on" in today's economy will lead him, not to mention the many other
researchers he has influenced, to restore this question to its rightful place at the centre of
macro-economic theory.
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